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PRIORITIES PUZZLE UNDER SHIP MORTGAGE AcT--The Ship
Mortgage Act' provides that a preferred ship mortgage, that is one
which complies with the requirements of the act, shall have priority
over all except "preferred maritime liens." It then proceeds to define
preferred maritime liens as those liens arising before the recording and
indorsement of the preferred mortgage in question, and also those liens
arising from damages resulting from torts, those arising for wages of
a stevedore when employed directly by the owner or operator, master,
ship's husband or agent of the vessel, and those arising for the wages
of the crew, for general average and for salvage.
It will be noticed that this enumeration does not include many mari-
time liens, arising either by virtue of the general maritime law or of
the Maritime Lien Act.2 The consequence would seem to be that
where there existed against a ship one or more of each class of lien
the claims secured by them should be satisfied in the following order:
(1) preferred liens, (2) ship mortgage, (3) non-preferred liens. This
'Supp. U. S. Comp. Stat. '23, § 8146% nnn; Fed. Stat. Ann., 1920 Supp.
255. The following discussion assumes the constitutionality of the Act, which
has been sustained by three decisions in the district courts of the United
States, The Oconee, 280 Fed. 927 (1921); The Nanking, 992 Fed. 642 (1923);
The Lincoln Land, 295 Fed. 358 (1923); but which reason must make doubtful
until the most authoritative determination is had. cf. The Belfast, 7 Wall.
624-640, 19 L. ed. 266 (1869).2 Supp. U. S. Comp. Stat. '23, § 8146 ooo; Fed. Stat. Ann., 1920 Supp. 257.
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would be simple enough if those liens denominated "preferred" by the
Act were, by the general maritime law, always superior to other mari-
time liens. But unfortunately for the cause of simplicity this is not so.
Ever since the John G Stevens3 the general rule has undoubtedly
been that each lien being a special property in the ship, it was subject
to further incumbrance in the shape of subsequent liens, in the same
manner as was the general property of the owner.4  Consequently, the
claims secured by maritime liens should be satisfied inversely to the
order of their creation.5 But to this general rule there are so many
exceptions that there are few actual cases for its application. These
exceptions generally arise from the classification of maritime liens into
various ranks. Liens of superior rank, such as for tort claims or
seamen s wages, take precedence over liens of inferior rank," such as
those for repairs or supplies. This doctrine is itself subject to the
qualifications imposed by the theory of "stale claims," which in effect
is that a superior lien is postponed to an inferior one if the holder
of it has not used due diligence to enforce it, and has thereby misled
others who have furnished services or supplies on the credit of
the ship.
7
Such being the general maritime law, it is entirely clear that those
liens denominated "preferred" by the Act of 19208 might be postponed
to later liens not so denominated. Let us suppose such a case and con-
sider the effect of an intervening ship mortgage under the terms of
the Act.
A tort lien is a preferred maritime lien. If one accrues, and subse-
quently9 a ship mortgage is executed and enrolled with the necessary
formalities, the tort lien would have priority as between it and the
mortgage. But the tort claimant may fail to exercise due diligence to
enforce his claim, and thereby allow it to become stale. If a supply-
3170 U. S. 113, 18 Sup. Ct. 544, 40- L. ed. 969 (1898).
4 See The America, 168 Fed. 424 (1909) 0- COL. L. REV. 490 (1922).
1 In the case of ordinary contract liens this principle is not strictly applied,
since all claims arising within a given period, which differ in various ports and
with different classes of vessels, are treated as if they arose at the same time.
The Interstate No. 1, 090 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 2d 1923) 38 C. J. 1039. The
principle should be strictly applied between other liens of the same rank. See
cases cited on p. -16 of LoaD & SPIRAGUE'S CASES ox AD3M1ILTY. It should be
applied in cases of torts (The America, note 4, supra), though that has some-
times been doubted, as in The Frank Fowler 17 Fed. 653 (1883). It was from
early time the rule with regard to the lien of bottonry bonds. The Prscilla,
5 Jur. (i€. s.) 1421 (1859). See in general, HUGHES, AD3ILALTY, Chap. 17. See
also John K. Beach, Relative Priority of Maritime Liens, 33 YALE L. J. 841(1905).
'The Samuel Little, 921 Fed. 308 (C. C. A. 2d 1915) HUGHES, ADMIRALTY,§§ 176, 1S3.
IThe Nebraska, 69 Fed. 1009 (C. C. A. 7th 1895) Norfolk Sand I Gravel
Co. v. Owen, lla Fed. 778 (C. C. A. 4th 1902). See notes on page 203 of
AxEs' CASES o. ADIiRALTY. The John T. Williams, 107 Fed. 750 (1901) The
Amos D Carver 35 Fed. 665 (1888).
See note 1, supra. Even aside from the Act, these liens are of high rank.
Under the terms of the Act, note 1, supra, it is immaterial whether the
tort precedes or follows the mortgage, but for the sake of clarity it is better
to suppose the tort as prior in time.
NOTES AND OOMMENT
man's lien now arose, the tort lienor would be barred by his laches
from claiming priority over the supplyman's lien.10 Yet there is no
reason to suppose that his priority over the mortgage would be lost,
because at the time the mortgage was given the claim was not yet
stale.1 It is very clear from the terms of the act, however, that the
mortgage would have priority over the supply lien.2 The result
would be that the supply lien ranked the tort lien, while the tort lien
ranked the mortgage, which in turn ranked the supply lien.
When such a case arises the court may squarely face that conun-
drum, or it may avoid it in either of two ways. First, it may entirely
ignore the maritime doctrine of stale claims on the ground that it is
superseded under such a state of facts by the Ship Mortgage Act.
The ranking then would be: (1) tort lien, (2) mortgage, and (3)
supply lien. The second possible solution is to interpret the Act's
definition of preferred maritime liens as including only those which
are pursued with proper diligence. Under such a holding the ranking
would be: (1) mortgage, (2) supply lien, and (3) stale tort lien.
The first of these rankings is peculiarly inequitable and not to be
adopted unless necessary. Moreover it assumes that the terms of the
Act cannot be complied with without abandoning the well settled mari-
time doctrine of stale claims, which it would seem, it is by no means
necessary to do. The second ranking is achieved by a most liberal
stretching of the statute. Indeed it almost seems directly inconsistent
with the act when it is recalled that the doctrine of laches only ap-
plies in favor of those who have in some way changed their position,
so that the delay would react to their disadvantage.13  The main ad-
vantage of either solution is that it affords relief from the necessity
of squarely facing the puzzling three-cornered priority mentioned
above.
Strictly analogous questions have arisen in courts of equity in con-
nection with priority of claims against land, and in a few cases the
apparently hopeless task of allotting A priority over B, B over C, and
C over A has been assumed. It must be confessed that there is no
harmony in the decisions, and that there is material for endless de-
bate. 4  The cases, however, in general espouse two outstanding
theories.
"See note 7, supra.
21 See The Key City, 14 Wall. 653, 20 L. ed. 896 (1872), to the effect that
a lien is not barred as against one who was not misled, though it might be as
against those who had been. See The John T. Williams, note 7, supra, to the
effect that a lien may be of no avail against one whose claim was innocently
acquired after the occurrence of laches, and yet not be barred as against other
claims to the ship.
'Supp. U. S. Comp. Stat. '23, § 81464 nnn; Fed. Stat. Ann., 1920 Supp.
255.
13 See note 11, supra.
"See 8 VA. L. Rmv. 550 (1922), and the cases there cited. The question
may arise under the recording. acts in circumstances more or less as follows:
A holds a mortgage, B takes a mortgage on the same land without actual or
constructive notice of A's mortgage. C then takes a mortgage with notice of
A's mortgage but without notice of B's.
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By the first theory1" the ship mortgage would be satisfied if possible
out of the balance of the sum representing the ship after deduction of
the amount of the tort claim. For example, if the ship brought $5000,
the tort claim being $4000 and the mortgage and supply claims $3000
each, then the mortgagee would get $1000. This is just what he
would have gotten if the supply claim had never arisen, for against
him it is given no effect. The balance of the whole sum left after
paying the amount so found due to the mortgagee is then still subject
to the supply lien and the tort lien. The former having priority over
the latter, is satisfied first, the remainder, if any, going to the tort
claimant. The result, in the case supposed, would be that the $4000
left after paying the mortgagee would go $3000 to the supply man
and $1000 to the tort claimant.
According to the second theory,16 the mortgage, being inferior to the
tort lien alone, should be satisfied as far as possible out of the whole
sum less the amount of the tort claim. In the case supposed, the
mortgagee would receive $1000. The supplyman's lien, being inferior
to the mortgage, should be satisfied, if possible, out of the whole sum
less the amount of mortgage, which would be $2000. After paying
out these there would be left $2000, which should be paid to the tort
claimant.
It will be noticed that the practical difference in the result of the
two theories is that by the first one the tort clainiant gets $1000 and
the supplyman $3000, while by the second they each received $2000.
There are two objections to the first theory It gives the supplyman
a lien to the extent of $3000 when all he could expect at the time
he furnished the supplies was a lien to the amount of the value of
the ship less the amount of the mortgage of which he had notice.
The impropriety of giving him more than this out of the proceeds of
the vessel is manifest when it is recalled that the very basis of his
superiority over the tort claimant is his reliance on the credit of the
vessel, induced by the tort claimant's inactivity An equally strong
objection occurs in that the result will vary according to whether one
by chance begins this process of reasoning with one or the other of
the parties to this three-cornered situation.
'-This seems to be the doctrine of the majority in Hoag v. Sayre, 33 N. J.
Eq. 552 (1881), though expressed in different manner. It has the approval of
the writer in 8 VA. L. REv. 550, cited note 14, supra. There are several other
cases, as pointed out in that article, in which no attempt is made to preserve
each claimant's priority, but one is arbitrarily selected to be the last in the
line. Cf. Ingram v. Pelham, 1 Ambl. 153, 27 Eng. Reprint 102 (1752).
"This is the doctrine of Dixon, J., in Hoag v. Sayre, note 15, supra. It
was applied in Day v. Munson, 14 Oh. St. 488 (1863). The Oluo court failed
to apply the doctrine in Campbell v. Sidwell, 61 Oh. St. 179, 55 N. E. 609
(1899), being doubtless influenced to discriminate against a vendor's lien in
that case, by the same considerations which led the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington to entirely disavow that doubtful equity.
NOTES AND COMMENT
The second theory is very satisfactory in the case supposed,'- but if
the figures had been tort claim $3000, mortgage $4000 and supply
claim $1000, then the second objection to the first theory would apply
also to the latter; for while it is true that the mortgagee and supply-
man have no just claim upon the fund in excess of the difference be-
tween the whole sum and the claim which is superior to each of their
respective claims, yet the same is true of the tort claimant, as would
appear if by chance we had begun our reasoning with him.
It is submitted that the true solution is that the tort claim being
inferior to the supply claim alone is entitled to $3000 in the case last
supposed. By the same process of reasoning the mortgage is entitled
to $2000 and the supply claim to $1000. Since all these may not be
paid out of a $5000 fund, it should be divided in the proportion of
3000 to 2000 to 1000. The tort claimant would then receive one-
half, the mortgagee one-third, and the supplyman one-sixth of the total
sum. If the authorities do not sustain this last method of distribu-
ton they are at least not so far committed to any other theory as to
refuse it consideration.' 8  Orlo B. Kellogg.
INHERITANCE BY A MURDERER FROM His VICTiM-The question
whether a murderer can inherit from his victim, except in the case of
life insurance, is usually answered in the affirmative. The rule is
well settled that if the beneficiary under a life insurance policy mur-
ders the insured, neither he nor his heirs or representatives can collect
the policy.' But in cases where a devisee or heir has murdered his
testator or ancester, the courts are divided, the majority2 holding that
I That is, the result would be the same where the sums were as first stated,
whether this method of computation or the one which the writer considers cor-
rec , is used.
" Supp. U. S. Comp. Stat. '23, § 81463A ppp; Fed. Stat. Ann., 1920 Supp.
257, provides that nothing in the Ship Mortgage Act shall be construed to
affect the "rank of preferred maritime liens among themselves." This note
has been concerned with discussing the effect of the Act on the relative rank-
ing of preferred maritime liens as compared with non-preferred liens, so the
latter section has no application. Nevertheless it might add still further com-
plication if, instead of being as we supposed, there had been two preferred
liens, one of which was subordinated to the supply claim by its holder's laches,
while the other was not.1 N. Y Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 997
(1886), Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 1 Q. B. 147 (1892), John-
ston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 83 W Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865, 7 A. L. R. 823
(1919). But see Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S. W (Tex. Civ. App.) 423
(1918).
2In re Kirby's Estate, 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1088
(1912), Hagen v. Cone, 91 Ga. App. 416, 91 S. B. 602 (1917) Wall v. Pfan-
8chmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785, L. R. A. 1915C, 328 (1914), McAllister v.
Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726,115 Am. St. Rep. 933, 7
Ann. Cas. 973 (1906), Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W 487, L. R. A.
1916E, 593 (1916), In re Gollnlk's Estate, 112 Minn. 349, 198 N. W 292 (1910),
Shellonberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W 935, -5 L. R. A. 564 (1894),
overruling Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W 700, 10 L. R. A.
810, 28 Am. St. Rep. 500 (1891), Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 940, 6 S. E. 794
(1888) Deem v. Milliken, 53 Oh. St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134 (1895), affirming 6
Ohio C. C. 357, Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111, 50 L. R. A.
